Western Washington University

Western CEDAR
WWU Graduate School Collection

WWU Graduate and Undergraduate Scholarship

2010

Emotion processing in high-functioning autistic children: a
priming task
Ashley E. Ruggles
Western Washington University

Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/wwuet
Part of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Commons

Recommended Citation
Ruggles, Ashley E., "Emotion processing in high-functioning autistic children: a priming task" (2010). WWU
Graduate School Collection. 75.
https://cedar.wwu.edu/wwuet/75

This Masters Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the WWU Graduate and Undergraduate
Scholarship at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for inclusion in WWU Graduate School Collection by an
authorized administrator of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact westerncedar@wwu.edu.

Emotion Processing in High-Functioning Autistic Children:
A Priming Task
By
Ashley E. Ruggles
Accepted in Partial Completion
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science

Moheb A. Ghali, Dean of the Graduate School

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Chair, Dr. Ethan Remmel
Dr. Ira Hyman
Dr. Kristi Lemm
Dr. Larry Symons

MASTER’S THESIS
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a master‟s degree at We
stern Washington University, I grant to Western Washington University the non‐exclusive ro
yalty‐free right to archive, reproduce, distribute, and display the thesis in any and all forms, i
ncluding electronic format, via any digital library mechanisms maintained by WWU.
I represent and warrant this is my original work, and does not infringe or violate any rights of
others. I warrant that I have obtained written permissions from the owner of any third party c
opyrighted material included in these files.
I acknowledge that I retain ownership rights to the copyright of this work, including but not li
mited to the right to use all or part of this work in future works, such as articles or books.
Library users are granted permission for individual, research and non‐commercial reproducti
on of this work for educational purposes only. Any further digital posting of this document re
quires specific permission from the author.
Any copying or publication of this thesis for commercial purposes, or for financial gain, is no
t allowed without my written permission.

Ashley Ruggles
July 18, 2010

Emotion Processing in High-Functioning Autistic Children:
A Priming Task

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of
Western Washington University

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science

by
Ashley E. Ruggles
August, 2010

iv

Abstract
Although high-functioning autistic individuals demonstrate normative intelligence, profound
deficits in social processing exist. Understanding emotions in faces can be particularly
difficult for autistic individuals. In the present research a priming task was used to uncover
the speed and strength of association between emotional faces and emotional words. Autistic
individuals are often capable of explicitly recognizing emotion in faces but still demonstrate
difficulty interpreting emotional situations. In the current study, emotional words were
primed by quickly presented matching or mismatching emotional faces. This may be more
similar to naturalistic social interactions in which facial expressions change quickly. The aim
was to examine any differences in reaction times and error rates in the priming task between
high-functioning autistic children and typical children. Groups were divided into older (8-16
years) and younger (7-11 years) groups to examine any developmental differences that might
exist between the two groups. Overall, no priming effects were seen across groups. Younger
typical children, however, did seem to be influenced by mismatching prime-target pairs.
This may point to a differential developmental trajectory in face and emotion processing
between autistic and typical children, as typical children were more influenced by face
primes than were older and younger autistic children and older typical children.
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Emotion Processing in High-Functioning Autistic Children:
A Priming Task
Autism is a developmental disorder marked by impairments in social interaction such
as regulation of eye contact, recognition of facial expression, and a lack of social or
emotional reciprocity (DSM-IV, APA, 2004). The CDC‟s Autism and Developmental
Disabilities Monitoring (ADDM) Network found that in 2007 as many as 1 in every 150
children were affected with the disorder. Between 1994 and 2006, the number of 6- to 17year-old children classified as having an autistic disorder in special education programs
increased from 22,664 to 211,610, demonstrating the substantial prevalence of autism and
need for research concerning the disorder (CDC, 2008). Autism differs from other disorders
in that its core deficit is in social interaction and this can be seen across the wide range of
abilities found in the spectrum, from low-functioning autistic individuals to high-functioning,
or Asperger‟s Syndrome (AS), individuals. Early indices of Autism Spectrum Disorder
(ASD) include deficits in social initiation, social approach, social smiling, social orienting,
social imitation, shared attention, and response to social reinforcers (Dawson, 2008). For
those on the higher end of the spectrum, the only apparent deficit in functioning may be in
their ability to empathize and socialize with others. With no explicit cognitive or language
delay proven to cause this social impairment, it is difficult to pinpoint the underlying
mechanism that produces social dysfunction in autistic individuals.
Impaired implicit processing of emotions in autistic individuals may provide evidence
that underlying cognitive mechanisms are responsible for this overt social dysfunction.
Specifically, understanding others‟ emotions by quickly reading their facial expressions and
being able to associate that emotion with other concepts stored in semantic knowledge may
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be hindered in autistic children, including high-functioning autistic children. This
impairment in quickly reading emotions may be more pronounced as the amount of available
facial information decreases. Autistic individuals particularly tend to avoid the eye region of
the face, making emotion processing from the eye region particularly difficult for autistic
individuals (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997;
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001; Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley &
Piven, 2007). The impaired implicit processing of emotions seen in this group of individuals
as compared to typically-developing individuals may provide clues as to the automaticity
needed to read and understand others‟ emotions (Critchley et al., 2000; O‟Connor, Hamm &
Kirk, 2007). Examining specific abnormalities in social processing of high-functioning
autistic individuals may give insight into the root cause of social impairment that appears to
afflict individuals at all levels of functioning on the autism spectrum.
High-functioning autistic (HFA) individuals as well as those diagnosed with
Asperger‟s Syndrome (AS) and Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not-Otherwise-Specified
(PDD-NOS) may appear functionally normative in everyday settings. The disorder becomes
apparent, though, in social settings where impairment is pronounced. High-functioning
autistic individuals do not differ from typical individuals in terms of intelligence. Autistic
intelligence has been often overlooked and misinterpreted according to typical tests of
intelligence such as the IQ test. According to Dawson (2008), high-functioning autistic
individuals often have normal or even above normal intelligence. In the past these individuals
have been pejoratively labeled as “idiot savants,” implying that while they often excel in
some areas, they lack greatly in others. This is especially indicative of high-functioning
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autistic or Asperger‟s Syndrome individuals who often display normative intelligence, but
are profoundly socially impaired (Baron-Cohen, 2000). Social dysfunction may be a deficit
universal to the autism spectrum regardless of intelligence. Why is it then that highfunctioning autistic adults and children can perform tasks with normative levels of
intelligence, but display such abnormalities in when it comes to social functioning? It may
be that they are impaired in certain cognitive domains that facilitate this social understanding
in typically-developing individuals.
Theory of Mind and Social Functioning
One of the main theories of interaction deficits in autism involves Theory of Mind
(ToM), and proposes that social dysfunctions result from an inability to process and interpret
mental states such as beliefs, desires, and emotions (Baron-Cohen, 2000). Theory of Mind
tasks that have frequently been found in the literature to be impaired in autistic individuals
include first and second order false belief tasks, recognition and conceptualization of mental
state words, and tests to infer complex mental states from facial features such as the eye or
mouth region of the face (Baron-Cohen, 2001). These are just a few of the many tasks that
appear to be impaired in both autistic adults and children as compared to typicallydeveloping individuals. Baron-Cohen (1991b) found that autistic children did not achieve
mastery of Theory of Mind tasks at the same age as typically-developing children and that
autistic children often displayed a pattern of attainment of ToM tasks that varied from that of
typically-developing children.
In the Empathising-Systemising (E-S) theory of autism, Baron-Cohen (2000) referred
to ToM as simply the cognitive aspect of empathy in relating to the social world. In this
approach, he listed a second component as necessary in social functioning, that of having an
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appropriate response to an affective social situation. It is here that autistic individuals may
fall short. They have the capacity to cognitively process incoming social information, but
they may not have the ability to infer an appropriate social response. Correlations have been
found between tests of ToM and empathic ability measures, such as recognition of emotional
faces or conceptualization of emotional words (Buitelaar & van der Wees, 1997; Dyck,
Ferguson, & Shochet, 2001). Social IQ, measured by tests of social situation interpretation
and the WAIS Picture Arrangement subtest to measure perspective taking ability, has been
found to be a mediating factor in emotion identification tasks (Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001).
The fact that cognitive and affective components of social processing are related and
impaired in autism may indicate that some underlying cognitive processing may produce
such impairments in empathic ability. Theory of Mind has been shown to be a specific social
cognitive impairment in autistic individuals apart from other cognitive abilities (BaronCohen, 1991a). When given tests of social cognition that do not involve attainment of ToM
understanding such as relationship recognition, interpersonal reciprocity, and understanding
of the animate-inanimate distinction, autistic children perform just as well as typicallydeveloping children (Baron-Cohen, 1991a). Apart from other cognitive abilities, being able
to understand specifically what is going on in another person‟s mind seems to be particularly
difficult with autistic individuals.
Explicit vs. Implicit Tests of Emotional Understanding
While autistic individuals perform similarly to typical individuals in some cognitive
tasks, differences between groups can be found in explicit versus implicit tests of emotion
processing. Tasks of social competence of autistic individuals often involve explicit
instructions, such as matching emotional faces or words to other emotional faces or words,
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and are usually performed with the same accuracy as typically-developing individuals
(Humphreys, Minshew, Leonard & Behrmann, 2007). Some researchers have argued that
these tests of social functioning simply illustrate the ability of autistic individuals to develop
compensatory strategies when asked to perform such explicit tasks, and that underlying
deficits in social cognition are masked by use of these compensatory strategies (Grossman,
Klin, Carter & Volkmar, 2000; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001). It is when these social
cognitive tasks require that the participant have an intuitive understanding of the other
person‟s internal mental state that autistic individuals demonstrate impaired performance.
Compensatory strategies developed over time by high-functioning autistic individuals may
mask actual implicit abilities of social functioning.
These implicit deficits could be uncovered through the use of face and emotion
processing tasks. Autistic children show a different pattern of comprehension from typicallydeveloping children when interpreting facial cues. Child and adult studies, though, can
provide very different findings and interpretations of results. Many studies utilize various
methodologies in which identification of emotions differs from matching of emotions.
Emotion identification tasks require that participants look at a face and choose from a list of
emotions the most appropriate answer (i.e., happy, sad, angry, etc.). Emotion matching tasks,
on the other hand, require that participants discriminate between two faces presented as to
which face displays a particular emotion (e.g., “Which face looks angry?”). In explicit tests
of emotion identification and emotion matching tasks, autistic adults are able to match
emotions with no difficulty, but show poor performance in comparison to typicallydeveloping participants when asked to identify emotions explicitly (Humphreys et al., 2007).
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Autistic children, however, show a different pattern of results. In a battery of face
processing tasks, autistic children performed worse than verbal mental age-matched and
chronological age-matched children, especially when asked to match emotional expression
and eye gaze direction as seen in faces (Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner & Tardif, 2004; Riby,
Doherty-Sneddon, & Bruce, 2008). Riby, Doherty-Sneddon, and Bruce (2008) found
emotional expression, lip-reading, and eye gaze direction identification tasks to be easier than
matching tasks for autistic children. For example, when asked to indicate which face was
“happy” or “sad,” autistic children performed just as well as typical children. When asked to
indicate which face “feels the same way” as another face, however, autistic children‟s
performance was impaired. It seems that autistic children are explicitly able to recognize and
identify emotion seen in faces. When asked to match these concepts to other emotional faces
or words, however, autistic children fail in comparison to typically-developing children
(Deruelle et al., 2004; Riby et al., 2008). On the surface this ability to recognize emotion is
unimpaired, but implicit understanding may fall short when high-functioning autistic children
must apply these concepts to other similar stimuli.
These findings suggest that autistic adults may have had ample time over the years to
establish conscious compensatory strategies in social situations, especially those involving
emotional understanding. Children may have not had the time or social training to be able to
mask their social impairment. O‟Connor, Hamm, and Kirk (2005) did not find any
differences in emotion recognition abilities between autistic and typical children. However,
parent reports of autistic children indicated that these children were significantly more
socially inept than their typically-developing counterparts. O‟Connor et al. (2005) pointed
out that this particular sample of autistic children had received social skills training that may
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have contributed to their equivalent performance on the explicit emotion task but may not
have helped with the children‟s overall social awareness. In studying the effect of age on
emotional comprehension strategies, Grossman, Klin, Carter and Volkmar (2000) divided
their sample of high-functioning autistic children into a younger and older group. When highfunctioning autistic children were asked to explicitly name the emotion seen in a face that
was simultaneously paired with either a matching (e.g., happy face/ “happy”) or mismatching
label (e.g., happy face/ “sad”), younger autistic children made significantly more errors than
typical controls when the emotional face was paired with a mismatched word. Grossman et
al. (2000) found that older AS children were less likely to be thrown off by a mismatched
label. These older children, then, may have had time to establish working compensatory
strategies and use them in their everyday social functioning. Compensatory strategies,
whether acquired through specific social training programs or from years of experience in the
social world, can have a confounding effect when determining the true capabilities of
emotional understanding in autistic individuals. Nonetheless their true capabilities may be
distinguished in the high-functioning autistic individual‟s ability to interpret and categorize
facial expressions in real time.
Neurological/Biological Evidence for Impaired Face Processing
In order to tease apart this potential confound of compensatory strategies used in
social functioning, some researchers have employed the combined use of explicit and
implicit measures in face perception. When autistic subjects are asked to perform explicit
tasks in emotion recognition from faces, their performance is comparable to typicallydeveloping individuals. However, this may veil the differential brain activity that is occurring
in performing explicit emotion recognition tasks. While able to perform similarly to typical
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subjects in an explicit emotion recognition task from both whole face and reduced features
faces (such as faces with only eyes or mouth visible), O‟Connor, Hamm and Kirk (2007)
found through ERP data that autistic subjects actually took longer to process this facial
information. This delay did not occur while processing objects. MRI data has also revealed
a differential pattern of brain activity in autistic individuals when implicitly processing
emotional faces, but a normative pattern of brain activity when asked to perform an explicit
emotion recognition task (Critchley et al., 2000). When high-functioning autistic adults were
shown emotional faces they processed these faces differently when asked to consciously
identify the specific emotion displayed than when they were asked to identify gender only.
In this way, Critchley et al. (2000) showed that underlying brain functioning was different
when consciously and unconsciously perceiving and interpreting affective faces. Differential
brain activation patterns according to MRI data have also been found in autistic individuals
compared to typical subjects when asked to make judgments of both faces and objects
(Schultz et al., 2000). In face processing, autistic individuals tend to activate the inferior
temporal gyrus, an area of the brain that is normally activated in typical subjects when
processing objects, as opposed to the fusiform gyrus that is normally activated when viewing
faces. In this way, brain activation patterns suggest that autistic individuals tend to process
faces more like objects. Brain processing is even found to be different in autistic toddlers
who do not show a varied brain activation pattern when viewing either their mother‟s or an
unfamiliar person‟s face as compared to typically-developing children who do show
differential brain activation (Dawson et al., 2002). These autistic children did, however,
demonstrate differential brain activation when viewing a favorite toy versus an unfamiliar
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object. The face, therefore, is not treated as a special category requiring special brain
processing for autistic individuals as it might be for typically-developing persons.
Impaired/Unimpaired Implicit Understanding of Faces
Researchers have examined the interference and facilitation effects that emotional
faces may have on other cognitive tasks. In a variation on the basic Stroop task, Ashwin,
Wheelwright, and Baron-Cohen (2006) laid colors over pictures of neutral or angry faces as
well as over pictures of chairs. They found that Asperger‟s individuals showed an attentional
bias to pictures of faces rather than to non-social stimuli in that they took longer to name the
color laid over these pictures than did typical subjects, but this delay in response latency was
not found for pictures of chairs. Perhaps faces, regardless of the specific emotion displayed,
take longer to process for autistic individuals and therefore are harder to categorize according
to affect.
This implicit difficulty in emotional processing may not be so easy to recognize in
high-functioning autistic individuals because these individuals are performing at normative
levels with regards to simple face perception processing. Contrary to initial evidence from
Langdell (1978) and Hobson, Ouston, and Lee (1988), recently researchers have suggested
that high-functioning autistic adolescents perform similarly to typically-developing
adolescents on a face inversion task. Specifically, Teunisse and de Gelder (2003) found that
both autistic and typically-developing participants performed worse when asked to match one
of two faces to a previously shown face when these faces were presented upside-down as
opposed to right-side up. They also did not find impairment in what they termed a
“Composite Effect”. To demonstrate this, the researchers cut pictures of faces in half
horizontally and skewed the bottom half either to the left or the right of the upper half,
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altering the presentation of faces to participants with regards to their juxtaposition. Teunisse
and de Gelder (2003) found that autistic individuals were just as good at recognizing faces
when given aligned and non-aligned upper and lower portions of faces. Typicallydeveloping individuals, however, performed worse when given non-aligned faces compared
to aligned faces. Presentation of the whole face may not be as important in face processing
for autistic individuals. Instead Teunisse and de Gelder (2003) suggested a more featurebased as opposed to configural-based search strategy may be employed by autistic
individuals when viewing and interpreting affect in faces.
Reduced Feature Face Processing
High-functioning autistic individuals have been shown to perform nearly or just as
well as typically-developing control subjects in correctly recognizing emotion when
presented with a whole face stimuli (Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001; Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson,
1997; Critchley et al., 2000; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Langdell, 1978; Spezio, Adolphs,
Hurley, & Piven, 2007, Lopez, Donnelly, Hadwin, & Leekam, 2004). As available facial
cues decrease, however, the ability to determine emotion becomes more difficult for autistic
individuals. This is demonstrated specifically when autistic subjects are given stimuli
involving only the eye region of a face and asked to determine both basic and complex
emotions (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997;
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001; Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, &
Piven, 2007). In comparison to controls, autistic subjects have an especially difficult time
reading and interpreting emotion from the eyes. Typical subjects rely on this information
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from the eyes as indicators of specific affect during social situations, although this may not
be the case for autistic individuals, who may show a particular avoidance from the eye region
in processing faces.
Some of the first research concerned with face processing in autism indicated a
preference for the mouth region in autistic children. Langdell (1978) found that autistic
children were better able to recognize their peers when given features from the lower half of
the face as opposed to typically-developing children who preferred to rely on features from
the upper half of the face. Recently, through the use of visual scanpath data, Pelphrey et al.
(2002) found that when autistic and typical participants were given pictures of emotional
faces and asked to name the emotion, autistic participants tended to view nonfeature areas of
the face significantly more often and core features areas of the face (i.e., eyes, nose, mouth)
significantly less often than controls. Facial expressions are often complex and interpretation
of them could vary depending on whether focus is placed on the mouth region, eye region, or
some other area of the face. This differential processing of facial features alone could
account for some of the variability seen in overall emotion understanding in autistic children.
Interpreting and Applying Emotion
Interesting findings arise when face processing involves both comprehension and
application of related emotions to be used in social interactions. It is here that autistic
individuals may display implicit differences between themselves and typically-developing
participants. Autistic individuals may be able to recognize emotion as seen in faces, but may
not be capable of correctly interpreting exactly what this emotion means during a social
situation (Bolte & Poustka, 2003; Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Golan, 2008; Klin et al., 1999).
Recently, Golan, Baron-Cohen, and Golan (2008) asked autistic and typically-developing
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children to interpret and predict emotional reactions of actors to specific situations seen in a
short film clip. Participants were given background information from the scene leading up to
the point where the actor was to respond to the situation in an affective manner. Children
were asked to indicate what they thought the actor would do or say next. Autistic children,
compared to typically-developing children, were impaired in this task, as it was difficult for
them to interpret the next sequence of events that should occur. At the behavioral level, very
young autistic children have also shown atypical responses to affective situations. Sigman,
Kasari, Kwon, and Yirmiya (1992) found that autistic toddlers looked significantly less at an
adult showing negative affect than did typically-developing toddlers. The autistic children
played with a toy more and appeared less concerned about the adult‟s negative affect than did
other children. It appears that autistic children are aware of the existence of other people‟s
reactions and emotions to certain situations, but have a difficult time understanding what that
means in terms of social functioning.
Theories of Emotion Activation and Association
Autistic children may be able to recognize a social cue as emotional, but may not
know how to use this information in a social context. According to a categorical theory of
relatedness that may be applied here to emotional understanding, pairs of items may prime
each other due to their mutual semantic relationship (McNeill & Burton, 2002). Bruce and
Young (1986) established a theory of person recognition that involves, at the first level, Face
Recognition Units (FRUs), that code a familiar person‟s face. Next, Person Identity Nodes
(PINs) recognize that person as familiar or unfamiliar, therefore representing the recognition
of that person. Finally, there is activation of Semantic Information Units (SIUs), which
represent all categorical information related to that person. It is in going from the Person
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Identity Nodes to the Semantic Information Units, argued Bruce and Young (1986), that
semantic categorization decisions and responses are made after activation of recognition of
that person.
As with person recognition, this model may be applicable to emotion recognition.
Emotions must be perceived, recognized, and identified by a person for efficient social
functioning. Within this framework, recognition of emotion must be able to activate other
concepts stored in the semantic pool of knowledge to be associated with that particular
emotion so that social responses made to the emotion are appropriate. Autistic individuals
may be able to explicitly recognize emotion seen in facial affect, but be unable to then
transfer this knowledge to activation of other associated concepts. So even though this
model pertains to person recognition, it is also relevant for emotion recognition and can
provide a basis for abnormalities seen in face processing and emotion comprehension in
autistic individuals, especially autistic children who have not yet developed social
compensatory strategies. The uneven profile of face perception skills seen in autistic
children (Riby, Doherty-Sneddon, & Bruce, 2008) may lead to differential activation of
semantic categorization, which would ultimately lead to misinterpretation of cues in the
social environment and overall social impairment.
The Present Research
In the present research, I attempted to tap into the speed and strength of association of
emotional facial cues and emotionally associated words through an affective priming task
involving quick presentation of facial affect. Affective priming tasks are designed to uncover
the strength of automatic associations between two affective concepts stored in memory
(Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). On a computer
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participants are first shown a prime, consisting of either a word or picture, for a short time
(1000 msec), are then shown a word or picture either related, unrelated, or neutral in valence
(positive or negative) with the previously shown prime, and are then asked to categorize the
target as positive or negative. Reaction times in responding to the target word are dependent
upon the target‟s associated strength with the prime. Highly associated primes and targets
should result in faster response latencies, whereas primes and targets with weak associations
should produce slower response latencies (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). This process of
affective priming taps into the strength of association of related concepts and can give a
relative indication as measured by reaction times as to the automaticity involved in the
evaluation of those primes.
To demonstrate the relative speed needed for interpretation of facial cues, an affective
priming task was administered to both typically-developing children and high-functioning
autistic children. Primes consisted of emotional faces presented for one second and
participants were asked to judge the positive/negative valence of target words following
primes. The ability to connect words on the basis of meaning through priming has been
shown to be intact in autistic children relative to normal children (Hala, Pexman, &
Glenwright, 2007; Lopez & Leekam, 2003; Toichi & Kamio, 2001), and semantic priming
has been shown to be effective across picture-word modalities with autistic participants as
well (Kamio &Toichi, 2000). However, Lopez, Leekam, and Arts (2008) found a significant
inverse correlation between face recognition in a semantic priming task and a semantically
associated object categorization task in autistic children. The autistic children in their study
were either good at face recognition or semantic categorization of objects, but not both,
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which may suggest that autistic children cannot integrate perceptual and categorical
information into one semantic store.
In the present research I attempted to demonstrate a deficit in face processing leading
to impaired affective categorization of information in autistic children compared to typical
children. I examined both error rates and reaction times of matching and mismatching
prime-target pairs. Performance in the affective priming task was then examined relative to
children‟s severity of autistic traits and social impairment. Those children who displayed
more autistic traits and who were more socially impaired were expected to perform worse on
the priming task overall. For typically-developing children, emotional faces were expected
to facilitate reaction times to matched emotional word targets and to inhibit reaction times to
mismatched emotional word targets. Since the current affective priming methodology
involving facial feature primes and emotional target words has not been previously used with
high-functioning autistic children, predictions of performance in this group were relatively
speculative. If reaction times of autistic children relative to typically-developing children
were slower overall regardless of face type presentation, this would support either an overall
deficit in face perception, or a deficit in affective association of concepts activated by
emotional faces. If autistic children performed just as well as typically-developing children
with whole face presentation, but performed worse than typically-developing children when
given eyes only or mouth only stimuli, then this pattern of results would suggest a particular
deficit in feature-based recognition of emotions that leads to a deficit in activation of related
concepts. Neutral primes (presentation of a black box in place of an emotional face)
provided a neutral condition that did not involve face processing. These predictions were
further analyzed according to younger and older autistic and typically-developing children.
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This was done to examine the presence of any age differences between the two groups and
assess whether face processing follows a similar developmental trajectory between autistic
and typical children. The hope with the present research was to highlight a specific
developmental deficit in the ability to affectively associate and categorize emotionally-laden
social cues in autistic children relative to typically-developing children and whether or not
this varied with age. Even though the literature has shown that autistic individuals are
capable of explicitly recognizing emotion, they are still socially dysfunctional. This
dysfunction, therefore, may arise out of an inability to efficiently and quickly relate
emotional faces to other concepts stored in memory, resulting in the overarching symptom of
autism, which is social impairment.

Method
Participants
Ten high-functioning children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) ages 7 to 16
were recruited from local schools, autism support groups, and parent associations in the
Bellingham, Washington area. Only those children diagnosed by a clinician as either HighFunctioning Autistic (HFA), Asperger‟s Syndrome (AS), or Pervasive Developmental
Disorder Not-Otherwise-Specified (PDD-NOS) were included in the study. Clinician
diagnoses were confirmed via parent report. Ten typically-developing children, matched on
verbal, nonverbal, and composite IQ, as well as chronological age, acted as a control group
and were recruited from the CLASP project participant pool at Western Washington
University. Participants‟ nonverbal, verbal, and composite IQ were measured according to
the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test Second Edition (K-BIT-2; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1997)
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to ensure that both experimental and control groups were matched according to overall IQ.
Autistic and typical children were categorized as younger if they were ages 7 to 11 and were
categorized as older if they were ages 12 to 16. Younger and older typical and autistic
groups, therefore, consisted of 5 participants each.
Materials
Autism Spectrum Quotient
The AQ-Child (Auyeung, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Allison 2007) is a 50-item
parent-report questionnaire used to quantify autistic traits in children aged 4-11 years. The
Likert-type measure ranges in scores from 0-150, with higher scores indicating greater
severity of autistic traits. A score of 76 or above on the AQ-Child indicates a level of
severity associated with both HFA and AS, with 95% of children diagnosed as HFA or AS
scoring at or above this designated score. The AQ-Child has demonstrated good test-retest
reliability (r = 0.85, p < 0.001), and high internal consistency ( = 0.97). AQ-Adolescent
Version (Baron-Cohen, Hoekstra, Knickmeyer, & Wheelwright, 2006) is similar to the AQChild, but is used to indicate severity of autistic traits in adolescents aged 11-16 and has
shown good test-retest reliability (r = 0.92, p < 0.001) and high internal consistency ( =
0.79). Scores on this measure range from 0-50. This measure includes a cutoff score of 30
or above to indicate severity of autistic traits.
Social Responsiveness Scale
The Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino et al., 2005) is a 65-item parentreport questionnaire that measures the autistic child's social impairments according to social
awareness, social information processing, capacity for reciprocal social communication,
social anxiety/avoidance, and autistic preoccupations and traits ( = 0.80). The scale is
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appropriate for children aged 4-18, and includes a wide-range of severity of social
impairment across the autism spectrum. Higher scores on the SRS indicate a greater severity
of social impairment. Scores range from 0-120, with scores above 80 indicating severe social
dysfunction associated with high-functioning autism.
Stimuli
Face primes were obtained from Pictures of Facial Affect (POFA; Ekman, 1993) and
the semantic priming stimuli set consisted of 36 different faces taken from this collection. Of
these, 12 different faces were included in each condition of the semantic priming task (6
positive/6 negative whole face condition; 6 positive/6 negative eyes only condition; 6
positive/6 negative mouth only condition). A neutral stimulus consisting of a black rectangle
in place of a face was also included 6 times per condition trial. Eyes only and mouth only
conditions were produced by removing all other core facial features from the picture so that
only the target feature remained. For example, the hair line, ears, and everything below the
eyes were not included in eyes only pictures of faces (See Figure 1). Positive faces included
those that portray happiness, and negative faces included those that portray sadness. Faces
were chosen according to specific norms outlined in the POFA and included faces that were
judged by at least 90% of raters as being happy or sad.
In addition to the 36 facial stimuli used in the semantic priming task, another 16 faces
were chosen from the POFA stimulus set for use in an explicit emotion recognition task.
Four different faces for each basic emotion of happiness, sadness, anger, and disgust were
included and counterbalanced between groups in a pencil and paper forced choice emotion
recognition task.
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Words used as targets during the semantic priming task included 18 items total, with
9 positively associated (see Appendix A) and 9 negatively associated (see Appendix B)
words randomly counterbalanced across trials, and were developed by the researcher and
piloted prior to the present study. All children included in the study were able to read these
words.
Procedure
To accommodate parent and child comfort levels, participants either came into the lab
for evaluation or a researcher visited them in their home.
One parent of each child completed either the AQ-Child or AQ-Adolescent version,
the Social Responsiveness Scale, and a demographics questionnaire. Next, a trained
researcher conducted the K-BIT-2 IQ test in a quiet room away from distraction.
The semantic priming task involved a 2 x 3 x 2 design in which group (autistic vs.
typical), prime face presentation (whole face, eyes only, mouth only), and prime-target
valence (matching vs. mismatching) were counterbalanced between groups. Neutral primes
(black rectangles) were included as a neutral control condition that did not involve faces to
evaluate reaction times for primes that were not faces. Six randomized experimental blocks
were administered in which 18 trials of each condition (6 neutral, 12 whole face etc.) were
presented. Within these blocks, one third of the prime-target pairs were matching (e.g.,
happy face prime, positive target word), one third were mismatching (e.g., happy face prime,
negative target word), and the remaining third consisted of equal numbers of positive and
negative target words following neutral stimuli. Equal numbers of positive and negative
faces were presented. The semantic priming task was administered on a laptop with Inquisit
software (Inquisit, 2002). Within each trial participants first see an orienting stimulus ( + )

20

for 500 msec, then a prime face stimulus (either whole face, eyes only, mouth only, or a
neutral black box) for 1000 msec, followed by a blank screen for 200 msec, and finally a
target word (matching or mismatching) appears on the screen until a response is made (See
Figure 2). Because face primes were presented for 1000 msec, which is above the threshold
of conscious awareness, participants were instructed to simply look at the first picture, and
only make judgments of the word that appeared next on the screen. Studies involving autistic
adult participants have included prime display times from as few as 600 msec (O‟Connor,
Hamm, & Kirk, 2007) up to as many as 2000 msec (Toichi & Kamio, 2001). In the present
research I employed, in conjunction with similar research involving autistic children
(O‟Connor, Hamm, & Kirk, 2005; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001), a prime stimulus time of
1000 msec to ensure that the prime information was perceived adequately by children,
especially those who may have attention difficulties. Participants who displayed difficulty
maintaining focus or who displayed discomfort during the task as judged by the researcher
completed only 3 blocks of trials as opposed to 6. One younger autistic child and two
younger typical children completed 3 blocks of trials as opposed to 6. All other children
completed 6 blocks of trials. Participants were asked to indicate whether the following
target word was positive or negative by pushing a button labeled with a smiling face for
positive and a frowning face for negative on the keyboard. No indications of incorrect
responses were given to the subject throughout trials as this may have distracted from the
task and could cause unnecessary frustration with the task that could interrupt reaction times.
The inter-trial interval was 1 second. To ensure that the task was understood, a practice
block of 8 trials was conducted before experimental trials were run so that the child could
become accustomed to the computer program and use of the keyboard. All participants
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indicated an understanding of the task after practice trials and continued on to experimental
trials. Error rates and reaction time (RT) measures only for correct responses were analyzed
between groups and among conditions for the semantic priming task.
The last task involved an explicit forced-choice emotion recognition task. This paper
and pencil test included 16 additional faces taken from the POFA stimulus set. Each page
included one face displaying one of four emotions and participants were asked to choose
from four choices provided (angry, sad, happy, disgusted) as to which emotion they believed
the face was displaying. There was no time limit for this task and errors were scored. This
test was administered to ensure that each group explicitly understood basic emotional affect
as seen in faces. All participants provided informed parental consent and were debriefed at
the conclusion of testing.
Results
Descriptive Data
Autistic and typically-developing children were matched according to chronological
age, nonverbal IQ, verbal IQ, and composite IQ. Autistic children scored significantly higher
than typically-developing children on the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS), indicating
greater social impairment in this group of children, t (18) = 12.50, p < .001, d = 5.59. Autistic
children‟s average scores on the SRS indicated a level of social impairment deemed
profoundly socially impaired according to the measure, while typical children‟s scores
indicated normative social functioning. Autistic children also scored significantly higher on
the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) than typically-developing children, indicating a greater
level of autistic traits, t (18) = 9.27, p < .001, d = 4.14. Typical children‟s average scores for
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this measure did not exceed the cutoff for autistic functioning. See Table 1 for means and
standard deviations of these measures.
Reaction Time
Overall, no priming effects were found for either autistic or typically-developing
children. Face primes did not affect reaction time for the following target words. Faces and
target words matching in valence did not produce faster reaction times than mismatching
prime-target pairs (See Figure 3). (Initially, a Windsor method of calculating average
reaction time scores was used, but this included a great number of outliers which added to
overall variability. Instead, median reaction time scores were used as an appropriate
reflection of average reaction time.)
A mixed-model ANOVA was conducted in which face presentation (eyes, mouth, or
whole face) and prime-target match (matching vs. mismatching) were within-subjects factors,
while group (autistic vs. typical) and age (younger vs. older) were between-subjects factors.
The analysis revealed a main effect of age on reaction time such that older children
responded faster than younger children, F (1, 16) = 10.82, p < .01, 2 = .40, MSE =
6744783.75 (See Figure 3). The ANOVA also revealed an interaction between face
presentation and prime-target match, F (2, 32) = 3.80, p < .05, 2 = .19, MSE = 63748.43,
and an interaction between face presentation, prime-target match, and age on reaction time, F
(2, 32) = 3.37, p < .05, 2 = .17, MSE = 56501.18. The 4-way interaction between face
presentation, prime-target match, age, and group approached significance, F (2, 32) = 3.06, p
= .06, 2 = .16, MSE = 51347.75.
An additional ANOVA was conducted to look at differences between groups with
regards to neutral prime conditions. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of face presentation
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on reaction time for neutral prime-target pairs, F (2, 32) = 4.06, p < .05, 2 = .20, MSE =
295033.03. There was no interaction between face presentation and group, F (2, 32) = 0.21,
p = .81, no interaction between face presentation and age, F (2, 32) = 2.36, p = .11, and no
interaction between face presentation, group, and age, F (2, 32) = 1.60, p = .22 (See Figure
4). When neutral primes were presented within blocks of trials involving whole face
presentation reaction times were significantly slower than neutral primes presented in blocks
of eyes and mouth only presentations, regardless of group and age. It seems that trials
involving whole faces took longer overall to process, whether it was a face or a neutral
prime. See Table 2 for means and standard deviations.
To further investigate the interactions, repeated measures ANOVAs (face
presentation x prime-target match) were conducted within each of the four groups: older
autistic, older typical, younger autistic, and younger typical children. For older autistic
children, younger autistic children, and older typical children there was no effect of face
presentation, no effect of prime-target match, and no interaction between face presentation
and prime-target match on reaction time.
For younger typical children, there was no effect of face presentation, F (2, 8) = 0.47,
p = .64, and no effect of prime-target match on reaction time, F (2, 8) = 1.71, p = .26. The
ANOVA did indicate, however, a significant interaction between face presentation and
prime-target match, for younger typical children's reaction time, F (2, 8) = 4.57, p < .05, 2 =
.53, MSE = 204396.63. Younger typically-developing children took longer to react when
eyes only prime-target pairs did not match. They showed an opposite pattern, though, with
mouth only trials. When mouth prime-target pairs matched, younger typical children took a
longer time to react than when mouth prime-target pairs were mismatched. Mismatching eye
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prime-target pairs seemed to produce some interference with regards to reaction time.
Mismatching mouth prime-target pairs, though, seemed to produce some facilitation of
reaction time scores. Thus the interactions indicate that only younger typically-developing
children were influenced by the match between face primes and words (See Figure 5).
Error Analysis
In terms of the priming task error data, ANOVA analyses did not reveal any effects of
group, F (1, 16) = 0.74, p = .40, age, F (1, 16) = 1.38, p = .26, or an interaction between
group and age, F (1, 16) = 1.03, p = .32, on error rates.
In terms of the explicit emotion recognition task error data, ANOVA analyses did not
reveal any effects of autism, F (1, 16) = 0.10, p = .76, age, F (1, 16) = 0.39, p = .54, or an
interaction between autism and age, F (1, 16) = 0.00, p = 1.0, on error rates. See Table 3 for
error rates.
Discussion
While both autistic and typically-developing children were matched in age and
intelligence according to verbal, nonverbal, and composite IQ, the two groups differed in
social functioning. Autistic children were profoundly socially impaired according to the
Social Responsiveness Scale, whereas typical children displayed social functioning in the
normative range. Autistic children also displayed greater severity of autistic traits according
to the Autism Spectrum Quotient than typical children displayed. The two groups, therefore,
were matched according to age and IQ, but differed in that autistic children were clearly
more socially impaired than typical children. Any differences of scores in the priming task
could then be attributed to group membership, either autistic or typical.
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Overall though, no priming effects were found for either autistic or typical children
regardless of age. Matching prime-target pairs did not produce faster reaction times than
mismatching prime-target pairs. There was also no difference in error rates in the priming
task between autistic and typical children. Error rates in the priming task were very low for
every group, which may suggest that the task was too simple. Also, the lack of reaction time
and error rate findings could be the result of a prime duration that was simply too long.
Banaji and Hardin (1996) have emphasized the importance of automaticity to facilitate
associations between prime and target within a priming task. A prime duration of one second
is well above the threshold of conscious awareness, allowing ample time to process a prime
and determine its relative usefulness to the task. Within one second children may have been
consciously able to process faces and then discard this information as useless when it came
time to judge the target words. Target words also remained on the screen until a response
was made, allowing an unlimited time to process the words. Perhaps if greater demands had
been imposed on children while processing target words, there would have been a tradeoff in
accuracy for speed. For example, allowing children only 2 seconds to process the target
word and make a subsequent judgment could have potentially produced differences in terms
of error rates.
There was, however, an interaction between face presentation type and prime-target
match that was apparent only for younger typically-developing children. Younger typicallydeveloping children seemed to have been affected by face primes when processing emotional
target words, although they did so inefficiently. It could be that at a young age typical
children are attempting to cognitively associate emotional faces with other emotional
concepts, but are not doing so efficiently. As they develop, however, typical children may
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use the face more efficiently, thereby diminishing any priming effects that may be evident at
younger ages. Both older typical and autistic children regardless of age may have ignored
faces altogether. Faces may not have been helpful to older typical children as they primed
only 33% of trials. Autistic children, on the other hand, may not have processed faces as
useful or not, but rather ignored faces completely regardless of their priming appropriateness.
There were no effects of prime-target match or face presentation for older typical children.
Also, both groups of younger children displayed high variability in reaction times, but for the
older typical children this variability decreased. The same was not true for autistic children,
who displayed large amounts of variability regardless of age. Perhaps face processing
becomes more stable over time for typical children, but remains an idiosyncratic process for
autistic children regardless of age. At older ages, face processing may become more
automatic rather than effortful for typical children.
Previously, researchers have explored the idea that autistic individuals may process
emotion with the help of compensatory strategies learned over years through social programs
and therapies (Grossman et al., 2000; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001). This idea of
compensatory strategies being used by autistic children was not fully supported in the current
research. Both younger and older autistic children demonstrated similar reaction time
performances and error rates to typical children, and were not influenced by face primes or
prime-target match. It may be that rather than an inability to conceptualize and associate
emotional faces and words, autistic children are simply not paying attention to faces to begin
with, which would lead to the current lack of a priming effect seen in this group. Autistic
children may be ignoring faces and only processing words, while typical children are
processing faces, deeming them useless, and then processing target words. Both proposed
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routes would lead groups to rely less on the influence of the face information when
processing target words.
Aversion to faces in autistic children may lead to an inability to quickly process
emotion in faces (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; Pelphrey et al., 2002;
Sigman et al., 1992; Spezio et al., 2007). Therefore, activation of other associated concepts
in memory is simply not possible because no emotional concept is activated in the first place.
Thus two cognitive routes may differentiate emotion processing in autistic and typical
children. Autistic children do not pay attention to faces and are unable to activate any other
emotionally relevant information, leading to social responses that may be considered
inappropriate. Typical children, on the other hand follow a developmental trajectory of face
processing in that early in life faces are effortfully used to infer emotion. This process
becomes more automatic with age so that faces are processed more quickly and efficiently.
The present priming task may have also imposed demands which exceed the true
capabilities of processing faces for autistic children in terms of speed and accuracy.
O‟Connor, Hamm, and Kirk (2007) found through ERP data that autistic subjects took longer
than typical subjects to process faces. This delay did not occur while processing objects.
Ashwin, Wheelwright, and Baron-Cohen (2006) also found that autistic individuals took
longer to process emotion in faces as opposed to categorizing objects. The current priming
task presented primes for one second. Future studies could vary this prime presentation time
to examine the relative attention paid to faces by autistic children. If autistic individuals
simply take longer to process faces then priming effects might be seen when the prime
presentation time is extended. Older typical individuals may process the face so quickly that
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it becomes useless in terms of facilitating or inhibiting categorization of words, and therefore
a priming effect may not be found with extended prime presentation times.
Schultz et al. (2000) found that when viewing faces, autistic individuals tend to
activate the area of the brain that is normally activated when viewing objects in typical
individuals. This suggests that autistic individuals process the face like an object. It could be
that autistic individuals take longer to process emotion in faces because they first activate the
face like an object and then must process the stimuli as a face while extracting emotion from
it. In addition, autistic individuals may be using some other form of compensatory
mechanism that does not rely on the face to make up for their inability to process emotion in
faces. This would support findings that autistic individuals take longer to process emotion in
faces because they follow a different cognitive route than do typical individuals. Future
studies could incorporate objects as well as faces into an emotional priming task with varying
prime presentation speeds to further delve into this speed of processing. In addition,
researchers could vary the usefulness of the primes with the idea that objects might be more
useful to autistic individuals, whereas faces would be more useful to typical individuals in
processing socially emotional targets. Also, using emotional faces as primes as well as
targets could be more useful and produce some facilitation or inhibition in a future priming
task. Similarly, differences between autistic and typical participants may be seen if objects
are incorporated as primes and targets into a priming task. Autistic individuals may be able
to process objects more quickly, whereas typical individuals may be able to process faces
more quickly. Varying the prime presentation speeds of object and face primes could help to
uncover how useful these stimuli are to each group. In real life, facial expressions change
rapidly, sometimes within hundredths of a second. Varying prime presentation speeds would
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be necessary to tap into this idea that face processing can become automatic over time. This
may be particularly relevant for typical children who may demonstrate a developmental
trajectory of face processing.
Flaws in the current research should be considered before designing another priming
study using face primes and word targets. The very small sample size of each of the four
groups makes it difficult to interpret patterns in results and results should be treated with
caution. Future studies would benefit from having larger groups and by making a uniform
diagnosis of autism within each group. The current study included High-Functioning
Autistic (HFA), Asperger‟s Syndrome (AS), and Pervasive Developmental Disorder NotOtherwise-Specified (PDD-NOS) children. Although all three diagnoses fall under the
Autism Spectrum, it is important to consider the individual characteristics of each that may
influence results. As seen in Table 2, the small sample produced a large amount of variability
in reaction times. Concentrating on one diagnosis of either HFA, AS, or PDD-NOS may
reduce the amount of variability in scores and lead to a different pattern of findings.
In general, the priming task did not work, and therefore no differences between
autistic and typical individuals can be accurately drawn. Future researchers may consider
varying prime duration and incorporating different prime stimuli to produce a priming effect.
It is important though, to first establish an effective methodology for typical participants first,
before administering such a task to autistic individuals. If the priming task does not work in
typical individuals, then administering it to special populations and drawing conclusions
from any differences found between groups would be invalid.
Although the current study‟s findings must be considered with caution, some
conclusions can be inferred. In conjunction with findings from O‟Connor, Hamm, and Kirk
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(2005), I did not find any differences in explicit emotion recognition between autistic and
typical children. However, according to the SRS, autistic children are profoundly more
socially impaired than their typical counterparts. It could be that when asked to explicitly
pay attention and name emotion in faces that autistic and typical children do not differ.
However, in a priming task that quickly presents faces as primes it could be that autistic
children simply choose not to pay attention to the face. This may be done as a coping
mechanism to combat any discomfort that emotional faces cause in autistic children. Since
they are not able to quickly and efficiently process faces they simply pay no attention to them
at all. This is not to suggest that autistic children are consciously choosing not to process
faces, but rather that faces are inherently difficult and somewhat unimportant to the autistic
individual‟s processing of his or her world.
In general, it is of interest to note that younger typical children were affected by the
face presentation and whether or not the face matched the target word. This would imply
some emotional activation and association of faces with other concepts in memory. These
effects were not seen at older ages in typical children, indicating some sort of developmental
trajectory of face and emotion processing. What is most interesting, however, is that no
effects were seen across the board for autistic children, further supporting the idea that
autistic individuals show a specific aversion from processing emotion in faces. Future
intervention and therapy research should as a first step consider the autistic child‟s aversion
to faces. Once attention is learned and regulated enough to be able to accurately perceive
and recognize the face as emotional, then the autistic child can delve further into processing
emotion. This could potentially ameliorate some of the inappropriate social affect and
difficulty in social interactions for autistic children.
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Table 1
Descriptive data measures between older/younger typical/autistic participants

Autistic

Typical

Measure

Younger

Older

Younger

Older

Chronological Age

8.76(1.06)

14.05(2.09)

8.80(0.83)

13.52(2.30)

Verbal IQ

106.40(18.93) 113.20(18.51)

112.20(18.51) 109.20(24.28)

Nonverbal IQ

106.60(21.23) 100.20(16.23)

106.80(24.04) 96.40(8.20)

Composite IQ

107.40(22.94) 108.00(19.66)

111.00(22.17) 103.20(15.82)

SRS Total*

119.20(26.24) 104.40(14.48)

10.60(7.09)

AQ Total*

100.20(14.75) 109.20(17.44)

34.80(19.89) 33.60(18.26)

20.80(13.42)

SRS = Social Responsiveness Scale; AQ = Autism Spectrum Quotient; * p < .05
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Table 2
Reaction time data between older/younger typical/autistic participants

Autistic
Face Presentation/
Prime-Target Match

Younger

Older

Typical
Younger

Older

Match
Eyes

1099.67(402.48)

923.86(826.82) 1194.92(222.39)

700.97(74.17)

Mouth

1127.57(504.91)

683.45(301.86) 1211.99(378.41)

689.48(112.40)

Whole

1089.93(300.51)

735.37(386.30) 1219.60(424.61)

662.58(71.87)

Mismatch
Eyes

1168.133(355.91) 726.73(319.03) 1218.73(251.38)

684.42(83.41)

Mouth

1094.82(336.56)

685.50(278.82) 1000.55(238.99)

679.62(113.28)

Whole

1195.00(532.37)

822.44(497.58) 1254.45(436.91)

683.30(90.57)

Neutral
Eyes

1024.10(333.68)

687.10(206.13) 1088.10(317.23)

648.60(53.09)

Mouth

1024.50(298.03)

633.00(222.67) 1078.40(345.28)

677.70(99.03)

Whole

1219.10(671.29)

795.10(450.58) 1629.50(909.86)

628.00(56.34)
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Table 3
Error data in percentages between older/younger typical/autistic participants
Autistic

Typical

Type of Error

Younger

Older

Younger

Older

Explicit Emotion
Recognition

19%

16%

18%

15%

Priming

5%

5%

8%

2%
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Figure 1. Example of whole face, eyes only, and mouth only prime stimuli.
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Figure 2. Example of priming task sequence.
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Matching/Mismatching Reaction Time
1400
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Young ASD

600

Young TD
Old ASD

400

Old TD
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Eyes Match

Mouth
Match

Whole
Match

Eyes
Mouth
Whole
Mismatch Mismatch Mismatch

Figure 3. Reaction time data demonstrating no priming effects but a main effect of age.
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Neutral Prime Reaction Time
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1200
1000

Eyes Neutral

800

Mouth Neutral

600

Whole Neutral

400
200
0
Young ASD

Young TD

Old ASD

Figure 4. Neutral prime reaction time data.

Old TD
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Younger Typical Children RT
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Figure 5. Reaction time data for younger typical children.
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Appendix A
Positive Words
Great
Love
Lucky
Joyful
Sweet
Wonderful
Awesome
Amazing
Super
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Appendix B
Negative Words
Rejected
Depressed
Terrible
Miserable
Shame
Horrible
Suffering
Awful
Sorrow

